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Corporate Governance and Financial Constraints on Strategic Turnarounds 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992) two-stage turnaround response model to 
include governance factors. In addition to the retrenchment and recovery, the paper proposes 
the addition of a realignment stage, referring specifically to the re-alignment of expectations 
of principal and agent groups. The realignment stage imposes a threshold that must be crossed 
before the retrenchment and hence recovery stage can be entered. Crossing this threshold is 
problematic to the extent that the interests of governance-stakeholder groups diverge in a 
crisis situation. The severity of the crisis impacts on the bases of strategy contingent asset 
valuation leading to the fragmentation of stakeholder interests. In some cases the consequence 
may be that management are prevented from carrying out turnarounds by governance 
constraints. The paper uses a case study to illustrate these dynamics, and like the Robbins and 
Pearce study, it focuses on the textile industry. A longitudinal approach is used to show the 
impact of the removal of governance constraints. The empirical evidence suggests that such 
financial constraints become less serious to the extent that there is a functioning market for 
corporate control. Building on governance research and turnaround literature, the paper also 
outlines the general case necessary and sufficient conditions for successful turnarounds. 
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Corporate Governance, Financial Constraints and Strategic Turnarounds 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In their seminal article Robbins and Pearce (1992) suggest a two-stage turnaround model that 
has recently attracted a lot of attention in academic and practitioner literature. According to 
this framework, a turnaround situation arises when performance criteria are sufficiently 
depressed to warrant a turnaround response. A turnaround response consists of activities 
likely to overcome the firm’s troubles and return it to match or exceed prior performance. The 
response consists of a retrenchment stage that might comprise “restructuring”, “downsizing” 
and “downscoping”, with a particularly strong emphasis on cost and asset reduction required 
for mitigation of the conditions responsible for the financial downturn. As a firm achieves 
stability it moves to the second stage of turnaround and engages “recovery response” 
strategies, which may include new market entries, mergers and acquisitions, new product 
development, etc (Robbins and Pearce, 1992, pp.306-307).  
However, such outcomes presuppose that entry into the first recovery stage is 
unproblematic. In this paper, we argue that there are important ex ante conditions that must be 
present in order that managers might enter the retrenchment stage. Specifically, managers 
must gain the support of finance providers for the proposed strategy and, as part of the 
process, realign profit expectations notwithstanding differences in short and longer run 
outcomes, so that there is a consensus of objectives between principal and agent groups. By 
introducing this additional turnaround stage, referred to below as the “re-alignment” stage, the 
paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992) model.  
   More recent research on turnaround suggests that the performance outcomes of asset 
and cost retrenchment are contingent on industry dynamics, which, in turn, affects the 
 3
underlying value of the firm’s assets (Morrow et al., 2004). This paper extends these 
arguments further and makes a contribution by suggesting that financial constraints on 
turnarounds may represent important factors affecting the success of this strategy.  These 
constraints are linked to capital structure and differential expectations about financial returns 
among governance groups.   
 The strategy research literature has tended to neglect the financial aspects of 
turnarounds. Even so, financial distress, which occurs where firms fail to maintain their 
capital and hence the value of the claims of financial stakeholders, might be expected to be an 
important feature of most (if not all) strategic crises faced by business organizations. The 
contention of this paper is that turnarounds cannot be sensibly analysed without taking into 
account the context of the financial obligations and related governance arrangements.  
 There are many cases where retrenchment is possible and indeed made easier for 
management when the onset of a crisis provides justification for unpopular decisions (Grinyer 
et al., 1988, p.95), but as this paper illustrates, this is not always the case. Where it is not, 
there will be a failure of an important necessary condition for turnaround success. 
Specifically, if the turnaround model is extended to include financial constraints and 
governance factors, allowing for their impact on managerial flexibility and turnaround 
performance (Jensen, 1986; Morrow et al., 2004), there are circumstances in which they may 
have the effect of preventing entirely the pursuit of all subsequent strategic options. The 
reasons why financial arrangements may impose serious constraints on such strategic options 
are twofold. These are explained in detail below. In summary they arise first because financial 
structure imposes fixed costs that are accordingly difficult to reduce without altering 
ownership rights. Secondly because in a crisis there might be a greater economic benefit to 
owners from the continued employment of all deployed assets relative to the opportunity 
benefit of turnaround strategies (Morrow et al, 2004), and asset sales are linked directly to 
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reordering of financial claims in circumstances of financial distress. Finally, the development 
of the market for corporate control (MCC) may increase the probability of firms adopting 
turnaround strategies since it increases the potential exit benefits to existing shareholders and 
provides financial resources during the recovery stage. The MCC refers to the existence of 
conditions, for example liquid share markets, transparent and flexible managerial labour 
markets, appropriate institutions of financial intermediation, promoting the realization of the 
collective value of the firm’s assets (Hitt et al., 1996).  
 Whereas many of the studies referred to above have used the individual firm, the 
current study also uses the industry as the unit of analysis. An important reason is that the 
paper develops strategic factor market (SFM) theory to explain asset values at the industry 
level. In the SFM approach such values can be related to normal economic returns, but also to 
accommodate the expectation that such asset values are influenced by industry level effects, 
particularly capacity utilization. 
The principal motivations of this paper therefore are threefold. Firstly, it aims to 
assess the importance of financial constraints as explanatory factors in the success or 
otherwise of corporate turnarounds. Secondly the paper aims to show that there are 
circumstances where financial constraints arising from crisis situations may impose a hard 
constraint on other strategic options, thereby preventing endogenous turnaround regardless of 
the attitudes, competencies and strategies of incumbent management. In other words, although 
prior studies emphasised managerial inaction as an important cause of turnaround failure (e.g. 
Barker and Mone, 1994; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Schendel, et al. 1976; 
Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989), inaction may not in itself be the product of poor management, 
particularly where financial constraints operate. Thirdly, whilst recognizing that finance, but 
not strategy, based research identifies financial restructuring as an integral component of 
turnarounds (e.g. Brown, et al., 1993; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990; Franks and Tourous, 
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1994; Gilson, 1989; John, et al., 1992), the paper shows that strategic and financial aspects of 
turnarounds are inseparable. To examine these propositions the remainder of the paper is 
divided into three further sections. The first develops a theoretical model explaining 
circumstances in which it might be expected that financial constraints impact directly on 
strategic decisions. The second examines an empirical case providing an exemplification of 
failure to restructure under hard financial constraints. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
A GOVERNANCE BASED-MODEL OF TURNAROUNDS 
 
Previous strategy research on the turnaround process commonly focuses on pre-identified 
stages. For example these might be the efficiency driven operating turnaround stages and 
entrepreneurially driven strategic recovery stages (e.g. Bibeault, 1982; Robbins and Pearce, 
1992; Slatter, 1984). These response stages are linked to the process of organizational decline 
and crisis, and related to the incidence of internal and external causes (Barker and Duhaime, 
1997; Bruton et al., 2003). External causes are related to environmental changes that make the 
firm’s existing strategy inappropriate, whereas internal sources of decline are associated with 
managerial error (Barker and Duhaime, 1997). Some authors indicate that both sources of 
decline may overlap (De Witt, 1998) demanding a complex managerial response in terms of 
operating solutions (e.g., retrenchment) and strategic solutions (asset reconfiguration, market 
re-positioning, etc.).  
 Whilst there is consensus on these elements of the turnaround process, there has been 
considerable debate about the importance of business turnaround strategies in the strategic 
restructuring and “re-invention” process (see Filatotchev et al., 2000, for a review). Barker 
and Mone, (1994, p.395) suggest that retrenchment is not a cause of turnaround performance 
but rather a consequence of a steep performance decline during which a firm’s financial 
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performance is extremely poor, an assumption supported by Barker and Duhaime (1997). 
There is also debate about whether such retrenchment strategies are necessary conditions at all 
as precursors for subsequent strategic turnaround actions (Castrogiovanni and Bruton, 2000). 
According to the latter view, strategic actions may be sufficient for successful turnarounds in 
some contexts and recourse to retrenchment strategies may be unnecessary or even counter-
productive (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994; Schreuder et al., 1991). Any attempt to extend the 
Robbins and Pearce stage-based approach must also deal with these criticisms. 
 A general defect of all existing approaches in the strategy literature is the relative 
absence of research on the financial aspects of turnaround (Morrow et al., 2004). Both agency 
(e.g., Jensen, 1986; 1993) and strategic management (e.g., Kochhar, 1996; Kochhar and Hitt, 
1998) research acknowledges that the structure of financial liabilities and related governance 
aspects may have an important impact on the firm’s strategic decisions. Jensen suggests that 
“changes in financial and governance policies generate value-creating changes in behaviour of 
managers and employees” (Jensen, 1993, p.869), emphasising the governance role of debt-
holders. Kochhar and Hitt (1998) find strong reciprocal links between the firm’s capital 
structure and corporate strategies, such as acquisitions and product diversification. Kochhar 
(1996) has developed a theoretical model that brings together analysis of capital structure, 
firm resources and strategic decisions and recent research has increasingly acknowledged the 
importance of governance factors as a constraint on managerial activity as part of the 
turnaround process (Daily and Dalton, 1998).  
 Whilst the Robbins and Pearce (1992) framework is a useful starting point, it is 
therefore underdeveloped in certain respects. Specifically, their arguments that, depending on 
the severity of the crisis, strategic repositioning must be preceded by cost reduction or asset 
sales is underpinned by the assumption that these financial strategies exist freely as options in 
all cases. Robbins and Pearce (1992) and other studies (e.g., Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; 
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Slatter, 1984; Grinyer, et al 1988, Grinyer and McKiernan, 1990) recognize the importance of 
retrenchment, they assume it to be an outcome of managers’ rational strategic response to 
organizational crisis. The contention of this paper is that the introduction of governance-based 
constraints restricts the availability of these options and can have a decisive impact on the 
turnaround process. 
 To consider strategic resources and their allocation through governance mechanisms 
in tandem, a strategic model is developed in this section, in which several further strands of 
theory are synthesised. These are strategic factor market (SFM) theory, corporate governance 
and accounting analysis of asset valuation and determination of financial returns. Combining 
these elements, a model, summarized in figure 1, can be used to analyse the turnaround 
process.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The first layer in figure 1 presents three stages of the turnaround process.  Stage 1 is 
an addition to the standard turnaround model, stressing the importance of existing governance 
arrangements and, in particular, the requirement for a re-alignment of expectations and 
strategic objectives of managers and external investors (equity holders and banks).  Stages 2 
and 3 broadly correspond to the Robbins and Pearce (1992) model of strategic turnaround. 
Moving from left to right, successful completion of the first stage is a necessary condition for 
commencing the next, so that for each there is a financial constraint in the second layer and a 
strategic outcome in the third layer, which depends on the completion of each respective 
stage.   
The second layer in figure 1 refers to evaluations by shareholders and debt-holders of 
rates of return, as well as the revenue generated by possible asset disposals, which, in turn, 
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depend upon profit rates and asset valuations consistent with each of the three turnaround 
stages and strategic outcomes. The transparency of these processes influences the 
effectiveness of monitoring by financial stakeholders and their evaluation of the likely 
financial and strategic outcomes of each turnaround stage. Where the expected rate of return 
(ER) of the managerial turnaround strategy is less than the investors’ required rate of return 
(R), and expected realizable value (NRV) is less than book value (BV) of assets, there is no 
benefit for stakeholders in supporting managerial strategic decisions. NRV depends on the 
present resale market value of assets whilst BV is the discounted sum of the expected stream 
of profits from continued deployment. At stage 1, therefore, there is pressure to re-align 
interests and expectations of managers and financial stakeholders, so that these converge. 
Successful completion of stage 2 requires net realizable value (NRV) to equal or exceed book 
value (BV). Finally, where ER is greater than R it is rational to enter or invest (Edwards, et 
al., 1987). These are also necessary conditions respectively for the completion of stage 3 and 
the overall transition through the re-alignment and retrenchment stages to a successful 
turnaround. 
The corresponding strategic outcomes in the third layer of figure 1 correspond to the 
appropriate turnaround stage. Failure to complete the first, re-alignment stage, results in 
strategic outcome 1, a continuation or “do nothing” strategy, with rate of profit expectations 
based on the BV of invested capital. Such an outcome is likely where BV exceeds the NRV of 
asset disposals. The second, retrenchment, stage requires some realization of invested capital, 
for example through disposal of old assets, exit from unprofitable segments and other 
downsizing activities, so that funds are available to finance the recovery strategy.  For success 
in this stage , it is necessary that NRV exceed BV.  If the condition is not met, there will be a 
reversion to the “do nothing” strategy. Expected returns from reinvestment of the proceeds 
from asset sales must then exceed the required rate of return, or if not, downsizing or 
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complete exit becomes the realized strategy. Only if both of these stages are complete can 
firms attempt the third stage recovery stage. Entering this stage is of course no guarantee of 
turnaround success, which depends on the expected and later actual returns exceeding the 
required rate of return once investments in new assets have been made.   
 Each element of the model in figure 1 depends on an interpretation and synthesis of 
different elements of theory, which are now discussed in turn. 
 
Strategic factor markets 
 
SFM theory offers a theoretical basis for rationalizing decisions, common to turnaround 
situations, to enter or exit specific activities and markets or market segments. It is a means of 
analysing the cost of acquiring new resources required to support the firm’s product market 
strategy (Barney, 1986) or in a turnaround situation it might be extended to consider the value 
of asset disposals (Morrow et al. 2004). The benchmark comparative is the economic value of 
an asset where SFMs are perfectly competitive (Barney, 1986). Imperfections in such markets 
will be reflected in higher entry costs, for example where the acquisition of the appropriate 
technology is expensive in the case of turnarounds (Morrow et al, 2004) By extension, SFMs 
create exit barriers where the asset resale market is thin. 
For Barney (1986, pp.1231-2, 1236-7) the MCC and capital sources are also SMFs. 
The model in figure 1 extends Barney’s (1986) approach to offer a financial dependency 
perspective to incorporating differential evaluations of strategic options and their expected 
profits from the perspectives of managers, shareholders and debt holders. In crisis situations, 
this governance component of the model is particularly important, as the views of the non-
managerial groups about asset valuation and prospective profit streams are of great 
importance, impacting on the employment or withdrawal of capital. Also important is the 
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degree of consensus or divergence in expectation between principal and agent. As argued 
above, divergence may prevent turnaround and consensus may be a necessary condition for 
turnaround.  Figure 1 reflects these relationships by suggesting that managerial decisions about 
the turnaround process are endorsed or contradicted by external finance providers.  
 
Governance arrangements 
 
Previous research linking capital structure and the firm’s strategy decisions acknowledges that 
information asymmetries between incumbent managers and external providers of finance create 
agency costs (Kochhar, 1996). Without reliable data on the new strategy’s risk and value 
outcomes, finance suppliers will be either unwilling to fund new strategic projects, or charge 
higher premiums because of the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard (Kochhar and 
Hitt, 1998, p.603). However, notwithstanding differential access to information, it also possible 
for these expectations to converge so that principal and agent groups agree on the strategic 
choice, particularly in the case of the tripartite discrete choices offered in figure 1. Insofar as 
principals do not support a particular choice where it might otherwise be rational, the 
governance structure constitutes an exit barrier. Bearing in mind information asymmetries and 
related risk problems, external financiers may use their voice-based governance powers to 
favour strategies with less potential upside but lower risk associated with them, and this direct 
strategic involvement may be driven by limitations on their ability to diversify their 
investments. Intervention by capital suppliers utilizing governance mechanisms is more likely 
and may be more effective when the base of asset valuation alters, because owners and 
managers will simultaneously seek new information about asset valuations in the new 
circumstances.1   
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Corporate governance research may accordingly be extended further by taking into 
account industry dynamics and inherited governance mechanisms that have evolved at previous 
stages of industry development (Cameron and Whetten, 1981; Quinn and Cameron, 1983). 
More specifically, because of their inherent inertia, governance arrangements that have evolved 
as a result of financing rounds at the growth stage may create substantial strategic barriers when 
industry’s fortunes change (Arthur, 1989). Some researchers have recognized potential 
governance constraints on managerial incentives to design and implement strategic restructuring 
in declining industries (e.g., Filatotchev and Toms, 2003; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992). In this 
paper we develop this framework further by suggesting that restructuring barriers may also be 
explained by financial constraints associated with governance factors. 
In conditions of uncertainty and heightened information asymmetry, managers and 
owners may evaluate these opportunities differently, and their preferences with respect to 
strategic options may not coincide even when managers are not engaged in self-serving 
behaviour (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). In addition to differences in expectations, managers 
and external investors may have different time horizons which may have further impact on 
their strategic preferences (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Brickley et al., 1988; Kochar and 
Hitt, 1998). More precisely, where BV is greater than NRV, principals’ views are more likely 
to converge on the steady state strategy and non-entry of the subsequent stages, even though 
managers may advocate retrenchment in the expectation of a subsequent long-run turnaround.  
Taking these factors together, the conditional availability or non-availability of finance 
may under certain conditions act as an entry barrier (Jensen, 1986; 1993). Similarly in 
conditions of industry decline, exit decisions will be mediated by corporate finance and 
accountability factors. Whether or not firms downsize and/or exit will depend in part on 
whether the NRV of assets allows financial stakeholders to liquidate their position without loss 
of capital. If such values are low compared to the value of profit streams from continued use, 
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then active monitoring by financial stakeholders may prevent retrenchment (Jensen, 1993). The 
governance and financial performance link is a further important aspect of these relationships.  
In terms of governance factors, the relationship between shareholders, debt-holders and 
managers in figure 1 depends on voice-based governance mechanisms and the presence of a 
liquid share market including the MCC (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1998; 
Franks and Mayer, 1997; Hart, 1995; Jensen, 1986; 1993). These are the observable outcomes 
of complex interactions of these governance arrangements, which rely on different channels 
of monitoring and control. Voice-based governance, for example, relies on boards of directors 
and their committees that perform their fiduciary duty to ensure managers maximize value for 
shareholders (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1994; Kochhar, 1996), or direct influence of large-block 
shareholders who have enough power to control managerial discretion (e.g, Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). More recent research, however, indicates that institutional investors may have 
different investment objectives (Hoskisson et al., 2002)2. A number of authors emphasise an 
increasing governance role for debt holders who may have a superior access to the firm’s 
information (Jensen, 1993; Citron et al., 1997; 2003), particularly in countries with 
“relationship” governance systems such as Japan (Kim and Hoskisson, 1996). 
 
Financial returns 
 
Theoretical models show that economic profit reconciles to cash flows generated by an asset 
or group of assets in any given time period and the difference in their opening and closing 
valuations (Edwards and Bell, 1961, Edey, 1962). It follows that strategic entry and exit 
decisions can be related to level of profit and asset valuation (Edwards, et al., 1987; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1992). Replacement cost (RC), BV and NRV, reflect in turn differences in value 
between new technology and deployed assets and between historic cost and current market 
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values. Firm specific risk associated with each strategy is higher in a crisis and it becomes 
more likely that expectations will diverge between principals and agents, so that entry into the 
re-alignment stage is problematic. In turnarounds, asset values, which change according to 
intended use, and act as collateral, are also important inputs into governance groups’, 
including particularly debt-holders’, decisions about whether to endorse or sanction strategic 
redirection.  
Another way in which investors’ attitudes change is if existing assets are under-utilized, 
either through temporary changes in demand or through longer-run over-capacity problems. 
In such cases, losses are incurred as a result of spreading fewer units of output over a higher 
cost base. In certain conditions of asset specificity, managers have an incentive to diversify 
the uses of such assets (Teece, 1980). In conditions of changing technology, capital losses 
arising from obsolescence may be also expressed as asymmetries between NRV and BV of 
assets on the assumption of continuing use. Further, declining realizable values of specific 
assets may create exit barriers where their use can be continued at low marginal but high 
average cost, for example in conditions of excess capacity.  
The final point of reference in figure 1 influencing the relationship between managers’ 
strategic decisions and external financiers is ER. As already noted, profit levels will affect 
deployed asset values as differentially perceived by external stakeholders. A further important 
aspect impacting on ER in figure 1 is the firm’s cost structure. Where industries are affected 
by downturns and crisis conditions the firm’s cost base, and the impact of costs not easily 
variable in the short run will be a crucial determinant of both expected profit and the ability of 
managers to stabilize cash flows. Fixed costs typically arise from sunk and specialized assets, 
which are sources of entry barriers and competitive advantage under the assumptions of SFM 
theory. A further possibility, investigated below, is that the fixed cost structure acts as an exit 
barrier where the fixed costs themselves arise from restructuring.  
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Synthesis and extensions 
 
Our arguments underpinning the theoretical model in figure 1 suggest that external financiers 
may impose constraints on managerial turnaround decisions. When their expected returns and 
net realizable value of asset sales are less than required rate of return and book value 
respectively, they will use governance channels to force managers to preserve status quo. 
Retrenchment actions may be taken when investors expect that assets sales will generate 
revenue higher than their existing book value. Finally, expected returns from investment at 
the recovery stage must exceed the required rate of return, or if not, downsizing or complete 
exit becomes the realized strategy. However, our model has a number of important internal 
and external contingency factors, such as presence of an MCC and financial structure of the 
firm. 
 The MCC is a SFM, in which differential expectations about future financial returns 
lead to overpayment by acquiring firms thereby creating acquisition premiums.3 The MCC 
utilizes all three valuation reference points in figure 1, where acquisition motives vary from 
accessing new and difficult to replicate assets, obtaining new streams of cash flow, or 
purchasing bundles of assets with high separate realization potential. Where demand for new 
finance is high, for example where technical development is rapid, there will be pressures to 
alter governance, accountability and reporting structures in favour of outside financial 
stakeholders. All these governance mechanisms are important since they facilitate the rational 
comparison of financial outcomes from the strategic options faced by current financial 
stakeholders. The combined potential effect of these governance factors on the probability of 
turnaround success is illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
 As figure 2 suggests the presence of a MCC is likely to promote turnaround 
opportunities, since it increases the potential realizability of exit values and also offers new 
financing opportunities during the recovery stage. With no MCC, there is no reason why book 
values should not exceed market values or vice versa, since exit values can only reflect the 
break-up value of the corporation. The positive impact of developed capital markets on 
strategic restructuring has been acknowledged both in the strategy and corporate finance 
literatures (e.g., Brickley, et al., 1988; Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 Alignment between asset base and financing arrangements is also likely to impact 
directly on turnaround capacity. Some researchers recognize different impacts on turnaround 
strategy associated with equity as opposed to debt financing (Kochhar, 1996). In theory, 
banks have a priority in repayment in turnarounds and restructuring4. Given that banks are 
first in the queue, there may be incentives for banks to wind things up to recover some value, 
even where shareholders might persist, with positive consequences for restructuring and 
capacity reduction.5 However, banks are also exposed to financial constraints related to asset 
valuation. Whereas bank loans are secured against replacement value of the assets, in a 
bankruptcy banks recover a liquidation value (Morrow et al., 2004)6. A study by Franks and 
Mayer (1997), for example, provides evidence that debt-related governance has been a 
handicap in achieving downward adjustments (i.e. labour and plant downsizing) during an 
international economic slowdown.7 Problems with restructuring of South Korean chaebols 
can be used as an example of banks putting good money after bad in a situation when they can 
recover only a fraction of the original loan to a struggling company.8 There may thus be a 
failure to exit from non-viable projects in a timely fashion. Financial economists also 
recognize that financial structure of the firm and governance roles of debt and equity 
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providers may have an important impact on organizational responses to performance decline 
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995; Grossman and Hart, 1995). Although there may be tax 
advantages to debt finance in some circumstances normal priorities for financial claims 
increase bankruptcy risk from the perspective of residual equity stakeholders (Altman, 1984), 
and by corollary reduce the probability of turnaround. For these reasons, figure 2 suggests a 
probability continuum, where turnaround probability is promoted by the existence of a MCC 
and within each set of institutional arrangements in general is higher where debt is lower. 
The relationships suggested in figure 1 and 2 offer several advantages in the analysis 
of strategic decision-making discussed above. To begin with, they present a logical 
framework for the analysis of financial performance using accounting data. Although the 
determination of performance is important in the fields of strategic management (Ketchen et 
al, 2004) and industrial organization, many economists are reluctant to use accounting data 
due to its perceived lack of reliability (Mueller, 1990, Schmalansee and Willig, 1991). 
However, the Edwards at al. (1987) analysis, whose assumptions are integrated into the 
model, suggests an analytical solution to these problems provided appropriate valuation rules 
are followed. Whilst financial performance may be a worthwhile measure for evaluating 
strategic outcomes, it is also useful for analysing the effectiveness of governance systems. For 
example, the MCC can be analysed with reference to wealth effects, where the distribution of 
gains from merger transactions is a function of differences in RC, BV and NRV. Finally, the 
framework is consistent with recent developments in financial theory, which has shifted 
emphasis from the value irrelevance of capital structure and dividend decisions to the 
relationships between active or passive investor monitoring arrangements and the value of the 
firm (Jensen, 1993). These relationships are increasingly recognized elsewhere, particularly in 
comparative and historical analysis of governance systems (Whittington and Mayer, 2000, 
p.13-14). 
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FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON TURNAROUND: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
Research methodology 
 
Researchers of organizational decline propose that the roots of a firm’s decline can either be 
based in an industry downturn or be based in firm-specific problems (Cameron et al., 1987). 
Industry-based decline occurs when “a firm’s industry shrinks in size or munificence, 
reducing the number of firms the industry can support and causing the firm and many of the 
other firms in the industry to suffer performance declines” (Barker and Duhaime, 1997: 18). 
As opposed to firm-level declines caused by managerial strategic mistakes, industry-based 
decline creates a homogenous population of struggling firms, and this makes causal links 
between firm-level performance and business turnaround strategy less ambiguous (Cameron 
and Whetten, 1981). Morrow et al. (2004) also suggest that industry dynamics may play an 
important moderating role in terms of the relationship between retrenchment and firm’s 
performance.  
Building on these arguments, we chose the British textile industry as an empirical 
illustration of the theoretical model for a number of reasons. First, the industry is endemically 
cyclical and therefore presents frequent opportunities through time and in different 
international and institutional settings to analyse survival threats and managerial response. 
Second, whereas turnarounds in the US textile industry have been examined elsewhere 
(Jensen, 1993; Robbins and Pearce, 1992), the depression that affected the British textile 
industry was more serious, and the British case therefore provides a useful test of the limits of 
existing models suggested in the above discussion. Two particular cases, the slump of the 
1920s and the corporate restructuring from the 1960s onwards, allow us to demonstrate the 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for corporate turnaround with varying levels of debt and 
equity finance in the absence and presence of a MCC. 
 In terms of research methodology, we use a quantitative and qualitative historical 
analysis, since “organizations are complex, variable-rich phenomena that can be studied from 
multiple perspectives” (Daft and Lewin, 1990, p.2). Following other quantitative and 
qualitative studies on business turnaround, we used a combination of case analysis of 
individual firms (e.g., Ruiz-Navarro, 1998), and analyses of published accounts of from 
different periods by experts, business writers, public press, etc (see Bruton, et al., 1994; 2003; 
for a similar research methodology). In addition, we conducted a detailed analysis of 
published financial data for sub-samples of firms at different stages of the industry life-cycle. 
This approach allows us to develop a longitudinal study across several organizations which is 
essential when one analyses complex and dynamic interrelationships between finance, 
organisational processes and strategy (Daft and Lewin, 1990; Lee, 1999). Cross sectional 
multiple industry content studies are inadequate for capturing these sequential patterns and for 
the assessment of under-researched process aspects of turnarounds (Chowdhury, 2002). 
Another specific advantage of the longitudinal approach as distinct from studies focusing only 
on the present time is that governance mechanisms, laws and capital markets can be explored 
as variables of interest as they change through time. In particular, the presence or absence of a 
MCC can be contrasted with the effects of (de)regulation, capital availability, workforce 
education level and socio-economic stability on asset restructuring. 
 
The 1920s: A turnaround failure 
 
In 1920 the British cotton textile industry enjoyed a post war boom. Many firms recapitalized, 
selling equity to financial syndicates and investment groups (Thomas, 1978, p.156). These 
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changes took place in a highly unregulated environment. The industry was highly 
competitive, made up of small, specialized firms, employing well-trained and educated 
workers (Fowler, 2003; Higgins and Toms, 2003). Within a year, the boom, along with export 
orders collapsed (Burnett-Hurst, 1932; Dupree, 1996, pp.270-71; 283-90). Figure 3 illustrates 
the extent of the boom and subsequent slump in terms of average company profitability. 
According to the Robbins and Pearce (1992) model the first response should have been at 
least cost reduction, and given the severity of the crisis, asset reduction. Neither of these 
responses materialized, although as the crisis lengthened they became increasingly important.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
The discussion that follows differentiates between industry level and individual firm 
strategies, and a short note is required to explain the interactions between managerial 
behaviour in both contexts. Because the individual firms were highly specialized, there were 
limited opportunities for downscoping within the product range, although downsizing the 
scale of operation was possible. Through associations of manufacturers, strategies were also 
determined at industry level, one example being the collective action taken to organize short-
time working as a response to the over-capacity problem. The result was to sustain the weaker 
firms and to share reduced output over the same fixed cost base (Keynes, 1981, p.582). 
Downsizing at firm level was therefore on the basis of a capacity sharing exercise at industry 
level. As the ensuing discussion demonstrates, the model in figure 1 works reasonably well 
whether applied to industry or firm level, and in the general case, it must be stressed, these 
somewhat unusual firm and industry interactions may not be present at all.  
 The main reason for the failure of the industry to restructure was the impact of 
governance-based exit barriers. Specifically these barriers were associated with the presence 
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of outside financial syndicates, which had invested in the industry during the recapitalization 
boom. To explore this further, we collected financial and economic data that was available for 
147 firms from the spinning sector for the period 1926-1931. These data show that where 
firms had recapitalized, and thus where the impact of outside investors was greater, the 
attrition rate of firms was lower and the rate of dividend payment higher. Out of a total of 70 
recapitalized firms, 57 (81.4%) adopted continuation steady state strategies during the period 
compared with 57 out of 77 (74.0%) non-recapitalized firms. These steady state strategies 
typically involved fierce price competition for the available contracts on the basis of covering 
marginal cost (Economist, 9 December, 1922, p.1076). From the point of view of the industry 
a necessary condition for turnaround was the exit of some firms as a solution to over-capacity 
problems (Keynes, 1981, pp.583-4, 591) and that was the strategy chosen by the residual 
firms. A further necessary condition was retrenchment of the existing cost base and 
reinvestment in new equipment so that unit costs could be reduced and overseas 
competitiveness restored. However the effect of the governance constraint, which again was 
pronounced in the recapitalized firms was to ensure that cash secured from contracts was paid 
out as dividends. The mean dividend rate for recapitalized firms was 5.8% compared with 
1.6% for non-recapitalized. In summary, governance factors prevented industry turnaround by 
constraining exit and prevented firm level turnaround by reducing cash available for 
reinvestment thereby preventing entry into the recovery stage.  
The presence of debt also tended to reduce the probability of turnaround success.  In 
the sample of spinning firms referred to above, high debt was associated with liquidations and 
complete exit from the industry. The debt to total capital ratio for liquidated firms was 43.6% 
compared with 34.8% for the surviving firms, illustrating the role of debt as a constraint on 
turnaround for individual firms. At industry level, in market value terms leverage ratio for all 
firms was made infinitely worse by the rise in bank debt to finance working capital and 
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trading losses and collapsing share values (Higgins and Toms, 2003).9 Keynes (1981, p.584) 
refers to 200 mills on an unsound financial basis for this reason. 
Although there were important differential effects of governance factors, different 
groups of shareholders and debt holders faced basically the same decision, which involved 
comparing expected profits from existing operations with the profitability of the retrenchment 
strategy.10 Putting aside some expectations that the downturn was cyclical and temporary, 
even low profit expectations from continuation were preferable to the alternative. Asset write-
downs would entail a re-ordering of financial claims to the detriment of the new investors 
who had bought in the recapitalization boom. Asset disposals at other than scrap value were 
prevented by the collapse of the second hand machinery market (Bowker, 1928). Collapsing 
export markets created spare capacity, whilst new technical advances in spinning and weaving 
processes rendered deployed assets increasingly obsolete (Ryan, 1930). Because there was no 
liquid share market and there was no functioning market for corporate control, decision-
making on retrenchment and capital redeployment remained in the hands of individual 
investors (Higgins and Toms, 2003). Labour markets were not a significant constraint and 
firms were able to impose short-time working on the basis of industry wide agreements 
(Bowden and Higgins, 1998). Investors chose rationally according to figure 1 to accept 
marginal profitability on their sunk investments in preference to the almost total loss of 
capital that would arise from exit. The result was paralysis, and subsequent stage strategic 
options that ought to have opened up in the Robbins and Pearce model failed to materialize. A 
crucial remaining question is that since the exit option was closed, why did firms not consider 
other strategic alternatives?  
Figure 1 suggests a comparison of the expected returns from deployed assets against 
those from the purchase of new assets. Newer and more efficient machinery was available 
(Board of Trade, 1932, p.135) that would have assisted firms seeking marginal contracts and 
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the option to undercut competitors. However there were several objections to this strategy. As 
we have seen above, as profits became available in successful companies, investors were 
quick to demand dividends as a means of liquidating their previously sunk and at risk 
investments. The most obvious objection from the investors’ point of view was that having 
lost capital already, this would be throwing good money after bad. A further consideration 
was that newer machinery was under patent protection, more efficient and therefore more 
expensive (Joshi, 1935, Sandberg, 1974). To deploy these machines efficiently required 
integration of spinning, intermediate processes and weaving (Higgins and Toms, 2003), 
effectively the complete reorganization of vertically specialized factory buildings or the 
construction of new ones. Taken together this strategy amounted to heavy commitment to 
high fixed cost assets in conditions of uncertain demand. In addition to cash flow from current 
operations and the proceeds of asset sales from the disposal of old capacity, it is likely that 
new financial sources would be required to sustain these investments. As has been shown, 
none of these sources of funding were available.  
 Ultimately crisis conditions and the failure of individual firm responses prompted 
outside intervention. To save the banks from bad loans and financial collapse the Bank of 
England intervened to close cotton firms down (Bamberg, 1988). This was not the first or last 
occasion of government intervention in lieu of strategic action by industry participants and 
where such interventions are necessary there may be further examples of strategic paralysis 
and turnaround failure.  
 
Post 1960: A turnaround success 
 
By the mid 1980s, Britain’s textile industry was reportedly better managed, more resilient and 
far more competitive than it had been for decades (Van de Vliet, 1988). Such a recovery was 
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remarkable in the context of the steady decline of textiles spanning back to 1920 and the loss 
of markets to cheap labour based competition (Singleton, 1991). The interesting question 
from the perspective of figure 1, therefore, is what had changed since the paralysis of the 
inter-war period? 
 There were two important and related changes. First, a combination of Bank of 
England imposed financial restructuring in the 1930s and profitable contracts during wartime 
allowed the surviving companies to rid their balance sheets of debt finance. Second, starting 
from the abortive ICI Courtaulds takeover bid in 1961, a liquid market for corporate control 
began to emerge. In terms of figure 1, the 1950s to a certain extent mirrored conditions of the 
1920s. Claims of the equity owners were based on obsolete assets with low realizable values, 
whilst replacement costs for new machines continued to escalate. In the 1950s, an illiquid 
share market promoted the strategy of continued use of existing assets, again exacerbating 
problems of over-capacity after the post-war boom collapsed in 1952, producing a new slump 
in corporate performance (figure 3). Although limited exit was promoted when larger firms’ 
capital was used to buy out shareholders at a price below asset book value but higher than 
realizable value (for detailed examples, see Filatotchev and Toms, 2003), these rationalisation 
attempts were rare. Instead, to secure survival, firms opted for political lobbying and subsidy, 
capacity sharing arrangements and price fixing deals. Price fixing was operated through the 
Yarn Spinners’ Agreement. Its abolition through legislation in 1958 accelerated the 
rationalisation of the industry along with the subsidy scheme of the Cotton Industry Act 1959 
(Higgins and Toms, 2000). The Act provided financial assistance for withdrawal from the 
industry and coincided with the beginning of a series of tariff reductions removing protection 
from overseas competition in the home market. In the 1960s there was a series of take-over 
transactions that further and quickly rationalized the industry, resulting in the rapid 
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concentration of the industry (Hannah, 1979, Rose, 2000), forcing remaining firms to adopt 
turnaround strategies to ensure survival.  
Although there were parallels between 1929 and 1959, in that both witnessed 
government intervention to enforce capacity reduction and rationalization, there were some 
very interesting differences with respect to figures 1 and 2. Most crucially, the creation of a 
market for corporate control meant that turnaround strategies could more easily be carried 
through. Unlike in the 1920s institutional investors did not demand excessive dividends. From 
an analysis of the accounting records and share registers for a sample of 45 firms in the period 
1959-1970, there was no correlation between institutional shareholding and the rate of 
dividend payment. We made comparisons between 10 successful turnaround firms (defined as 
firms that were trading profitably in 1970) and a sample of 10 similar sized firms that failed in 
the period 1964-1970. The average dividend payment (as a percentage of profit) of the 
surviving firms was 37.3% compared with 50.3% for failed firms. The successful firms 
reinvested available profits to fund capital equipment purchases, thereby allowing them to 
enter the recovery stage. Turnaround successes spent twice as much on capital equipment as a 
proportion of turnover. In contrast to the 1920s, successful survivors were not prevented by 
governance constraints from making the reinvestment required in the recovery stage. From an 
analysis of their share registers, turnaround successes had an average of 27.4% of capital 
owned by institutions, in contrast to 16.7% for failed firms. These firms also had low debt to 
total capital ratios (13.0%). Unlike in the 1920s, investor groups were able to envision and 
accept alternative strategies, including restructuring and reinvestment.     
 An important reason for the non-application of the dividend constraint in the 1960s, in 
contrast to the 1920s was the development of a liquid market for corporate control. This also 
reduced exit barriers and the way paved for industry restructuring. In the 1920s there were no 
cases of companies being taken over by other companies, whereas in the 1960s a large 
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number of companies were bought and sold.11 Once purchasers were available, the incentive 
of incumbent investors to enforce the continued use of old assets strategy was greatly reduced 
because the market capitalization of the firm provides an alternative basis for the NRV break 
up value from the investor’s point of view.  The point is well illustrated by the acquisitions of 
David Alliance. For example the balance sheet of Rothwell Ltd showed book value net assets 
of £1,337K in 1962, and Alliance offered £1044K for the shares, in excess of the market 
capitalization of £783K. Cash consideration was the norm for acquisitions in this period since 
exiting shareholders enjoyed high earnings yields vis a vis acquiring shareholders, for 
example the acquisitions of Smith and Nephew (Foreman-Peck, 1995). The amalgamations of 
the early 1960s transformed the British cotton industry into the most concentrated in the 
world (Rose, 2000, p.287). The motivation for these acquisitions was related diversification 
from established businesses adjacent to cotton and wishing to control supply. This motive 
explained Smith and Nephew’s acquisition of mills in Brierfield and the Rochdale area in the 
1950s, the acquisition of Lancashire Cotton Corporation by Courtaulds and ICIs acquisition 
of Viyella (Foreman-Peck, 1995, Rose, 2000, Owen, 1999). Product relatedness and 
associated economies of scope explain why acquiring firms could in many cases offer a price 
in excess of NRV without destroying value for their own shareholders. Rationalization 
nonetheless followed acquisition in many cases by the major combines, thereby facilitating 
the capacity reduction and asset replacement that had been impossible in the 1920s and 
difficult before 1960. For the first time therefore investment in new machinery as a cost 
reduction strategy became a realistic option for large sections of the industry.12 In the 
companies taken over by David Alliance that ultimately became Coats Viyella, in Courtaulds 
and in Smith and Nephew, old mills purchased from incumbent shareholders were re-
equipped with modern machinery (Ormerod, 1996, Foreman Peck, 1995). Unlike in the inter-
war period the important recovery stage component of the turnaround model could be 
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implemented. Channels of new equity-based financial sources for these projects via City 
financial networks were utilized (Toms and Filatotchev, 2004) for the first time since the 
reflotation debacle of the 1920s.13   
 
Implications 
 
The empirical example shows that linkages in process between the main stages of the Robbins 
and Pearce, (1992, p.291) model are far from automatic. In the light of the examples it is 
worth reconsidering this model and extending its scope with reference to figure 1. Perhaps 
most significant, as demonstrated above, is the requirement to add a re-alignment stage as a 
precondition for firms entering the retrenchment and recovery stages. However, there are 
further and subtler extensions, illustrating the potentially problematic preconditions for 
transition in the remaining stages. In the Robbins and Pearce model, financial problems are 
addressed at the first retrenchment stage, which aims to stabilize operations and restore 
profitability by pursuing cost and/or asset reductions. Recall that the expected return in figure 
1 and the subsequent realized level of profit reflects the cost base of the firm. Where cost 
reduction strategies are pursued, the process is facilitated where the cost base of the firm is 
variable. Where the cost base is fixed, it is more difficult to stabilize cash flow without also 
altering the strategic basis of activity. To the extent that financial distress is severe and/or 
strategic health is weak, asset reduction becomes increasingly imperative for turnaround 
(Hofer, 1980; Pearce and Robbins, 1993). However, as the illustration suggests, the causes of 
financial distress may also impact on the disposal value of assets. This is very important 
because the effectiveness of asset reduction strategies as a precursor to subsequent recovery 
depends substantially on the ability of the firm to generate cash flow from these disposals. 
Although the literature uniformly presupposes this to be possible, in the empirical illustration 
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and in the general case there are difficulties arising from asset specificity, liquidity in the 
second hand market and similar exit barriers. 
 Special cases may be derived from the model in figure 1, which illustrate the impact of 
combined factors on turnaround strategies. The first is where asset values impose a hard 
constraint on exit strategies and prevent constrained firms developing second stage recovery 
strategies through reinvestment in product/process innovation. The typical economic model 
assumes no capital rationing (Weingartner, 1977), but capital allocation to an industry depends 
on governance structures and lending conditions. With very high levels of capitalization, high 
asset specificity and low resale values in external markets, financial and physical capital 
supply becomes highly inelastic, or subject to hard rationing. In other words, positive net 
present value (NPV) projects will be rejected even when the outcome is positive with a high 
degree of certainty. Where these conditions apply, it is difficult and perhaps even impossible 
for incumbent management to apply the standard turnaround prescription. In the case of 
British textiles in the 1920s, sunk investment in old machinery and the attitudes of investors 
prevented investment in new machinery, even where firms were otherwise returned to profit. 
Low resale values for highly specific assets prevent stabilization of cash flow in the 
retrenchment stage. Nor can overhead costs be reduced, where as in this case they arose from 
fixed financial claims. Even leaving these problems aside nothing can be done in the recovery 
stage even if it can be entered, as the positive NPV projects that must now be rejected are the 
necessary investments in new product and process. In terms of figure 1 parameters this means 
that however much crisis conditions drive down financial performance, the economic rate of 
return from the “do nothing” strategy is superior to the loss of capital associated with exit at 
low resale value. Meanwhile lack of cash flow from such realizations and the hard rationing 
constraint prevent reinvestment in new products and processes, however profitable they may 
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be.  Financial claim holders will therefore rationally, through the governance structure, 
impose the “do nothing” strategy on management.  
As far as the role of debt finance is concerned, the explanation is similar to Hart and 
Moore (1995), but the scenario presented here shows the holders of equity in recapitalized 
assets to be in the same position. It follows from the scenario in the 1920s that although debt 
compounded the problem, even without debt, outside equity holders can impose similar 
constraining strategies on management. In terms of figure 2, although debt made the problem 
worse, in the absence of a market for corporate control the turnaround problem would have 
been almost as formidable for all equity financed firms. In these circumstances, shareholders 
will aim to extract any remaining value from assets in use, for example by undercutting 
competitors to obtain marginal contracts. Such limited strategies may further intensify 
competition. Where the crisis is generated by a sudden and sustained fall in demand, failure to 
exit due to the relationships suggested above will accentuate the crisis further by creating 
over-capacity. These features characterized many staple industries in the UK and other 
industrialized economies in the 1920s and 1930s. By the 1960s, although the underlying 
causes of industry decline remained, turnaround at the level of the individual firm was made 
possible by the evolution of the market for corporate control, a mechanism not available to the 
politicians and industrialists responding to the slump conditions of the inter-war period.14 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Some turnaround researchers suggest that retrenchment strategies involving the sale of critical 
assets might be detrimental as a result of trading short run survival for longer run strategic 
advantage (Barker and Mone, 1994). The ultimate objective of retrenchment is to improve 
organizational efficiency and increase performance relative to the environment, but results from 
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the few empirical studies in this area are mixed so far (Bowman et al., 1999, p. 45). Moreover, a 
number of studies indicate that across-the-board layoffs and ultimately the relinquishing of 
market share may produce performance trade-offs resulting from the loss of critical employees, 
lower employee commitment and morale (see, for example, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994).  
The model presented in this paper suggests a more complex story. First, re-alignment 
of expectations is required so that principals see the opportunities in terms of revised expected 
returns arising from agents’ proposed turnaround strategies. Retrenchment remains an integral 
part of the turnaround process for the reasons suggested by Robbins and Pearce (1992), but 
realignment is a precondition and governance constraints may therefore prevent the 
retrenchment stage being entered.  Second and closely linked, the paper has illustrated that 
asset sales are not always discretionary and governance arrangements may prevent such 
disposals, particularly where outside investors favour their continued use as a means of 
fulfilling dividend expectations. As the case above illustrates the problem is acute in 
specialized firms, but may be less likely in multi-product firms where managers are more 
likely to be able to re-deploy resources from one sector to another. More generally, it is easy 
to see how such problems are mitigated by the existence of a market for corporate control, but 
without establishing a precise linkage between the existence of such markets and the efficient 
deployment of assets. For example, as mentioned above, the market for corporate control may 
push managers into downsizing the firm in an inappropriate or harmful fashion (Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1994). Even so, any advantages of strategic flexibility arising from the functioning 
of the market for corporate control are only precisely apparent where managers avoid 
investment in highly specific assets with associated high levels of fixed cost. Investments in 
such assets, which have entry barrier characteristics associated with difficulty of replication 
by competitors, are the sine qua non of superior performance according to the SFM theory. In 
short, firms cannot have their cake and eat it. They either commit themselves to high fixed 
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cost sunk investments paying the price in the event of a crisis, or they avoid them and thereby 
avoid crisis, but instead fail to achieve competitive advantage and only receive the normal 
profit levels at the given stage of the business cycle. 
Another important implication is that the development of the market for corporate 
control is closely related to industry development and therefore more general economic 
development where such development depends at least in part on asset restructuring. Other 
socio-economic factors often associated with restructuring, such as capital availability via a 
functioning stock market and banking system, an educated workforce and a deregulated 
economic framework can all be present, as the case illustrates, but are nullified without a 
functioning market for corporate control.  
Although our research uses historical empirical evidence, this paper has important 
implications for more contemporary research on business turnaround, especially in countries 
that do not have developed and liquid stock markets, such as transition and developing 
economies. For example, in their study of retrenchment and downsizing strategies in 
transition countries, Filatotchev et al. (2000) show that in the absence of a market for 
corporate control, privatization programmes resulted in insider ownership and a consequent 
failure of ailing, formerly state-owned enterprises to restructure and modernize. In addition, 
research on the roles of banks in transition economies suggests that over-exposure of financial 
institutions to loans to inefficient enterprises created a “systemic failure” when banks impose 
financial constraints on restructuring and closure enterprise of heavily indebted failing firms 
(Saunders and Sommariva, 1993). The study therefore complements others, which have 
examined international variations in institutional contexts. Generalization is limited due to 
such variation, although one with important implications for asset restructuring in developing 
countries is the relationship between increased market governance and efficient resource 
allocation (Hoskisson et al, 2004, p.527).   
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To conclude, the paper has shown that a complete theory of turnaround requires 
researchers to incorporate asset valuations as part of their analysis and show how such 
valuations influence the selection of strategic options, impose constraints on managerial 
action, and motivate their principals to enable or restrict the implementation of such options. 
To understand these complex dynamics, researchers should examine the precise options 
available to managers through auditing imperfections in the firm’s strategic factor markets, 
including particularly financial markets and the market for corporate control. In general they 
should develop longitudinal frameworks encompassing industry life-cycles that relate firm 
strategic dynamics to the valuation of strategic factor inputs and to structures of corporate 
governance.   
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Figure 1: Financial constraints on corporate turnarounds – an analytical model  
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Figure 2: Corporate Governance and Turnaround Probability 
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Note: The data series is collated from accounting data for all quoted firms, in the Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence, 1920-1948 and on the Cambridge University Companies 
Database, 1949-1985. Return on capital is profit before interest and tax divided by the book 
value of shareholders’ equity plus long term loans.  
Figure 3: Average Profits in Cotton and Textile Industries, 
1920-1985
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NOTES 
                                                          
1  Apart from financial, there may be other constraints on strategic restructuring. For example, 
in an owner-manager firm, founders or second generation owners-managers may have 
personal links with the business that would inhibit them from retrenchment and downsizing, 
and this problem is accentuated by a paucity of alternative employment opportunities 
(Schulze et al., 2001).  This discussion goes beyond the scope of our paper where we focus on 
relations between external finance providers and hired managers.  
   
2 Tihanyi et al. (2003, p.197) acknowledged that the identity of owners has important 
organizational implications because different owners may have different objectives and 
expectations. For example, some authors (e.g., Brickley et al., 1988; Kochar and David, 1996) 
differentiate between “pressure-resistant” and “pressure-sensitive” institutional investors. 
Pressure-resistant institutions, such as investment funds, are unlikely to have strong business 
links with their investors, and they may have stronger influence on strategy choices and their 
performance outcomes (Hoskisson et al., 2002).  On the other hand, “pressure-sensitive” 
investors such as banks are likely to have business relationships with the firms in which they 
invest (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Because they often have an obligation to support the 
management’s agenda, their governance role tends to be more passive compared to “activist” 
investors (Tihaniy et al., 2003). However, more detailed analysis of roles and expectations of 
different owners goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
3 In the 1990s such premiums averaged 40%, although it has been shown that if the premium 
is greater than 25% it is unlikely that the acquiring firm will earn back the premium (Sirower, 
1997). Some premiums may be appropriate because of the expected synergy while others are 
likely to represent overpayments.  
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4 In the UK, in the event of bankruptcy control rights pass to the secured creditors. Conditional 
upon default, they have an exclusive right to decide whether, when and how to seize the 
company’s assets and liquidate them. A designated secured creditor appoints a registered 
insolvency practitioner, the receiver, to take over all powers of the firm’s board, and to make 
sure that sufficient funds will be realized to repay the debt to the secured creditor. The 
receiver has no duty to consider interests of other lenders, and has decision-making rights 
over whether to sell the firm as a going concern or close it and sell it piecemeal (see Franks 
and Sussman, 2004, for a detailed discussion). Unsecured creditors have few control rights 
and do not participate in the sale of firm’s assets. However, they have some liquidation rights 
and they can apply for a winding up of the firm by a liquidator. Unlike the receiver, the 
liquidator operates on behalf of all creditors, but without a power to change the order of 
seniority (Armour and Frisby, 2001). 
 
5  For example, in their study of bank-driven restructuring of small and medium size UK 
companies, Franks and Sussman (2004) indicate that the concentration of collateral and 
liquidation rights the hands of the main bank gives it a dominant position in restructuring a 
defaulting firm. However, they also find that the bank’s dominance makes it “lazy” in 
monitoring, relying heavily on the value of its collateral in timing bankruptcy decisions. 
Citron et al. (1997) explore the role of loan covenants in the relationships between banks and 
management buy-out (MBO) firms. They find evidence of close bank/MBO relationships and 
bank involvement in effecting turnaround of financially troubled MBOs. 
 
6  For example, in their study of 42 failed MBOs Citron et al. (2003) provide evidence that 
secured creditors recover only 62 percent of the amount owned. However, this percentage 
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increases where the distressed buy-out is sold as a going concern, which may explain why 
banks in their study prefer this form of restructuring. Franks and Sussman (2004) report 
similar recovery rates using a larger sample of financially distressed firms in the UK. 
 
7 More recently, banks have endeavoured to avoid liquidations using “corporate recovery” 
services provided by accountancy firms. However, although this may help banks to recover a 
higher proportion of their problem loans, “corporate recovery” firms cannot eliminated 
financial constraints on turnaround strategies of highly leveraged firms. 
  
8  This behaviour resembles what Ross and Staw (1993) call “escalating commitment” when 
explaining how organizations become committed to losing courses of action over time. These 
authors suggest a number of determinants of escalation that include, in addition to 
psychological and social factors, such strategic aspects as project closing costs, salvage value, 
“sunk costs”, etc. A possible impact of these factors on banks’ decisions to provide further 
finance to failing firms may shed a new light on the limitations of debt-based governance, but 
this discussion goes beyond the scope of the paper. 
 
9  The average leverage ratio for all 147 firms was 37% with a standard deviation of 33%, 
indicating that many firms were highly levered. If the market value of equity is used instead 
of book value, the situation for the highly geared firms was much worse. By 1931, many 
companies experienced collapses in share values, resulting in very low market capitalizations. 
For example Laurel and Compton spinning companies both had capitalizations of < £5000 but 
outstanding debt of more than £40000 (source: Tattersall’s). There were many similar cases. 
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10  Leading accounts of the crisis of the 1920s (Keynes, 1981, Bamberg, 1988) concentrate on 
the role of the banks and ignore the shareholders. Such emphasis is incorrect, and the 
shareholders played as important role (Higgins and Toms, 2003). The dynamics of the 
turnaround model and the coincidence of interest between debt holders and shareholders 
highlighted in this paper support the re-interpretation of this chapter of economic history. 
    
11  From 1900 there were waves of mergers in textiles (Hannah, 1979). These were voluntary 
amalgamations and associations, often accompanied by stock market flotation or re-floatation 
(Macrosty, 1907, Higgins and Toms, 2003). There were no share-for-share bids for control in 
the open market and hostile bids on such a basis did not occur in this or any other sector until 
the 1960s (Littlewood, 1998).  
 
12  This restructuring was undertaken when the firm became part of larger, vertically 
integrated combine, and this represents a departure from the original Robbins and Pearce 
(1992) turnaround model that focuses on strategic choices of an independent firm. However, 
restructuring strategies involved retrenchment and modernization that are outlined by Robbins 
and Pearce (1992) framework. 
 
13 Evidence on re-equipment at Coats Viyella and utilization of financial networks, 
particularly nominee accounts held by Rothschilds was taken from an interview transcript 
with a former senior executive of the company. 
 
14 There were other legal and regulatory changes that may have had an impact on success or 
failure of turnaround strategies during the period of study. For example, the UK contractualist 
approach to bankruptcy and liquidation has changed since its formative years in the late 19th 
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century from not imposing any constraints on the contract to the accumulation of a body of 
case law that has standardised particular lending instruments (Franks and Sussman, 2004).  
Court-administered Administration and Company Voluntary Arrangements procedures of the 
more recent Insolvency Act further even out the allocation of rights in bankruptcy across the 
secured and unsecured lenders and provide the company with temporary protection from 
creditors’ actions. However important they may be, these legal developments do not change 
the main arguments of this paper. Similarly, Note 1 above emphasises possible impacts of 
family control on business strategy. Because hardly any new textile firms were founded after 
1920 but the attrition rate was slow during the protracted subsequent decline (Rose 2000, 
Higgins and Toms, 2003), it is reasonable to suppose that the proportion of family firms to 
publicly quoted remained approximately constant. 
